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4 April 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

[redacted]
Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community

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FROM

: [redacted]
Director of Performance Evaluation
and Improvement

SUBJECT

: The Status of RPM-11 as of
April Fool's Day

1. This is an unpleasant memorandum. But I write it in the expectation, or hope, at least, that its contents can be conveyed to the DCI.

2. The DCI's action on and related to PRM-11 is in a shambles in the immediate aftermath of the 1 April meeting of the DCI's Subcommittee. We should have been on the street with a first draft today or tomorrow. But the DCI said jettison the whole approach we were on. The problem is not that I and others working on it cannot construct a report and a process for getting it that have some chance of meeting the deeply conflicting demands that were expressed at that meeting. The problem is that we cannot continue to proceed blindly on behalf of a Director who does not appear to understand what we are doing, who seems unwilling to state directly to his team what he expects of our effort and perceives to be the right strategy for getting through this extraordinarily important exercise.

3. I cannot, and I believe, you cannot afford to go into another meeting like this one and have the DCI tell us what was done was not what was needed or expected (despite previous instructions). But that is the least risk. More important by far, he cannot afford, and the interest of a sound outcome for PRM-11 cannot afford, such a clear lack of strategy and communication. One may suspect that the future of the Intelligence Community is already decided or being decided behind the scenes by the President, the Vice President, the DCI, and key Senators. But is this is not

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the case, or only partially true, the DCI runs the risk of losing what influence and control he has over the outcome, and looking foolish in the bargain.

4. Our action on PRM-11, i.e., Task 2, is at the center of two conflicts.

5. First, we have what is now very clearly, but not surprisingly, a deep conflict with the Department of Defense. Having huddled long enough to rewrite two of the key issues for 1 April, the Defense members came in determined to fight the very concept of a strong DCI as Community manager. They believe that the PRM itself is prejudicial in favoring such a concept. They object to placing the role of the DCI in the center of the study. They expressed clear preference for returning to the era of the November 1971 directive and IRAC, and for splitting the DCI from CIA to boot.

6. It now appears to me that this conflict is sufficiently clear and deep to make a joint assessment of the DCI's roles and the state of the Community impracticable. Working in committee at the staff level merely assures protracted argument over what issues are legitimate to address, what opinions are legitimate to express, and what the facts are, not to mention what the right final judgments are. In the end, we are going to get two very different appreciations of the problem from the DCI's family and from the leadership of DOD.

7. Logically, the efficient way to deal with this conflict is for the DCI's people to write as fair an assessment as they can from the DCI's point of view and then let the DOD write a counter-assessment with rebuttals in both directions. The danger of this approach, however, is that it will cut off the DCI's effort from support he may find in DOD entities such as and NSA. I am increasingly doubtful about the degree of that support, but it would be a shame to ignore what there is. This is a delicate trade-off, but it is the DCI's to make. Hoskinson has conveyed to me that Brzezinski views this as the DCI's report, to be assembled as he sees fit.

8. The second conflict is with Brzezinski over the options and the relationship of Tasks 2 and 3. This is a needless procedural conflict between two key parties who are probably in broad agreement on goals. But it threatens to unravel the whole enterprise unless the DCI is much more sure of himself with Brzezinski that I have reason to believe he is.

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9. Brzezinski will probably react to reports of the 1 April meeting in one of two ways. He may immediately instruct the DCI to keep the Task 2 effort from meddling in options. This will only add intolerable strain to those already present. Or he may avoid a showdown on who does options now, but remain sufficiently annoyed with the DCI to compromise what should be a very strong alliance between them when crucial decisions are reached.

10. This conflict is not really the DCI's fault but built into the awkward structure of the PRM. He has a perfect right to start his thinking about the "bottom line" whenever he chooses. And he started asking for this early. We resisted -- or at least I did -- in order to get on with the formal job of Task 2. Now it is imperative to get on with looking at options. But we would do well to separate that from the Task 2 report, certainly keep it out of that Subcommittee arena, and compose our differences on this with the NSC by making it clear that the DCI's work on options is only to clarify his own thinking and to be of use to Task 3. A real scrap between the DCI and Brzezinski on this is silly and avoidable . . . unless I just do not know what is going on.

11. My view of the "game plan" for the Task 2 report coming out of the 1 April meeting is as follows:

a. I am working on a report that has four parts:

1) An introduction that contains a discussion of the broad and many purposes of intelligence, the overall context of many suppliers and users into which the DCI fits;

2) An analysis of the DCI's present role (a compressed version, perhaps, of the present outline that the DCI said should be "jettisoned");

3) A summation of what is right and what is wrong with the DCI's present role in this larger context;

4) A total layout of organizational options with consideration of their consequences, plus and minus, but all pretty neutral as to preference.

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b. Depending on the state of relations with Brzezinski, the options discussion can be included in the report or torn off for the separate use of the DCI and as an early input to Task 3.


c. This will be impossible to do in a Community working mechanism. Officers responsible to the DCI will do this report and then seek countering positions as needed.

d. The schedule will have to slip because what we have already prepared now must be boiled down into a smaller section of a broader report, two new elements must be prepared, and the 1 April meeting provided no substantive guidance on the real issues relating to what is right and what is wrong with the Community.

12. Assuming this is a sound plan, to proceed with it we still must have clear DCI understanding, approval, and willingness to defend what we are doing. This requires that he sit down with his PRM-11 team and senior counselors on the subject and go through all the issues and pitfalls that are handled so badly in meetings like the one on 1 April.

13. If he is unwilling to take the time to get his own act together, and perhaps even if he is, he has another choice: To identify a senior official of his family who has the stature, experience, tact, strength, intellect, and free access to the DCI needed to take charge of PRM-11 and all related actions on Community structure during the next two-three months on a full-time basis. I do not know who this person is, but it certainly is not I as I am presently operating.

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